I
t was two years ago that I first introduced the Health Incentives Reform Act. Since that time I've learned a lot about health care in this country. I've learned which government programs work and which ones don't work. I've learned about fraud and abuse. I've learned about getting the best health care in the world to the people who need it. And I've learned how much it all costs. But through it all, my faith in the principles underlying the Health Incentives Reform Act has not wavered. I started out with a strong belief in the value of choice and the strength of the private sector. Somewhere along the way the ideas were translated as procompetitive and that's true, but the underlying theme remains consumer choice.
Choice gives individual consumers the opportunity to select a product or service that best meets their needs. The most successful provider of that good or service will be the one that best responds to consumer desires-whether these desires include cost, quality, appearance, or other factors. These very basic elements of a competitive market do not exist in health care. The ultimate consumer of health services, the patient, is usually insulated from the cost of care by a private or government insurance plan.
When patients do share in the cost of their health care, they find there's nothing to shop around for; in other words, no choices. How many employees have a choice of health plans? How many Medicare beneficiaries do? Not many. And without consumer choice to stimulate providers to be responsive and efficient, we really can't expect doctors and hospitals to change their behavior. More regulation won't cure the ills of our health system. But neither will the status quo. We must introduce the basic elements of choice and competition into health care.
In the course of thinking about these issues I've come to realize that achieving a better health system entails much more than simply enacting a so-called procompetitive bill. No single bill can include all elements needed to make our health system more competitive. The reason we have market failure in health care cannot be attributed to any single piece of legislation in the past. The course to our present state of affairs has been incremental, and likewise our movement toward greater competition will have to be incremental. That doesn't mean that our action will be limited or slow in coming. It only means that we will act broadly and persistently.
An incremental approach requires that a competitive framework be established which can be used to formulate positions on the entire range of health issues. It's very easy for health policymakers to view issues in isolation and forget the contribution each one makes to the whole. You can't expect a business to produce a good product if each division sets its own agenda. There has to be coordination and an overall corporate strategy. Improving the health system is no different. It needs an overall framework.
I have thought a lot about a framework for health. I have, indeed, developed a set of guiding principles through which I will view health issues in the future. Most of these principles apply to other issue areas in addition to health and are representative of my general philosophy on the role of government in society.
1. Choices are good. Government policy should expand choices to the individual, not limit them. Monopolies in service provision, whether public or private in nature, should be avoided. Citizens benefit from choice, whether it's in the form of competition with Ma Bell for long distance rates or in the alternatives to the U.S. Postal Service for package delivery. Government has done a reasonably good job of extending health care choices to its employees through the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP). Similar choices should be extended to Medicare beneficiaries and to veterans.
2. The government is generally a better purchaser of services than provider of them. Government does not allocate resources as well as private markets and should directly provide services only when a private alternative is unavailable. In cities like New York, private bus lines are able to make a profit on runs the Transit Commission consistently loses money on despite charging the same fare. Another example is in the area of municipal garbage collection. Those communities like Newark, Kansas City, and Minneapolis that contract out for refuse collection are able to save millions compared to communities that directly provide the service.
A further extension of this principle is that, if possible, government payments should go through the beneficiary, rather than directly to the provider. Consider the GI bill as an example. Veterans were given the choice of going to whichever institution they wanted for their education. This approach is certainly preferable to building exclusive veterans' colleges to handle all veterans' education. In the area of subsidized housing, special projects conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in Green Bay, Wisconsin and South Bend, Indiana have demonstrated that housing allowances, a form of voucher, give beneficiaries a range of satisfactory choices and made the market more responsive. The same approach should be used with Medicare and Medicaid.
3. Consumer choice is enhanced as information increases. Government policy should facilitate the flow of information. Individuals cannot be expected to make sound choices if they are provided with insufficient or inaccurate information. Furthermore, information must be presented in a straightforward and comparable manner. Individuals should not have to compare apples with oranges. Consider the value and popularity of a publication like Consumer Reports. It helps us compare products on the basis of cost and quality. On the other hand, look at the information the government provides federal employees under the FEHBP. There seems to be plenty of information there, but at least for me it is very difficult to make heads or tails of it. Information must be provided in a usable form.
4. The price of a good or service should be a true measure of its cost. Government policy should not facilitate hidden costs or cross-subsidizations. A good example is the subsidy our government provides for tobacco. It is bad enough that the government gets in there and mucks up all the price signals that would otherwise be shaping the market, but then to recognize that tobacco is so unhealthy on top of that is a contradiction. It just doesn't make sense. In the health area, Medicare cost allocation formulas often force hospitals to shift legitimate expenses to private, paying patients. Such cost shifting does not save the system any money, but it does distort the price signals buyers perceive. Consumers should get what they pay for and pay for what they get.
5. The government should guarantee access to necessary care. However, standards of access cannot be open-ended and must be realistic. Not every town has a Bloomingdale's or a hospital or an orthopedic surgeon, but access to these facilities and services is usually reasonable. In the medical area, geographical access is only one issue; there's also economic access. We provide medical services to those who can't afford them. But consider the difficult issue we face as medical technology offers us expensive new treatments for disease. True, the treatment may be better, but is it worth ten times the cost? We simply cannot afford a health system which sets standards solely on the basis of available technology with no regard for price. Setting standards for access is a thorny but unavoidable government responsibility.
6. A responsive market will have fluctuations in capacity. Temporary shifts and increases in capacity are to be expected as a market adjusts. Shifting buyer preference causes some producers to increase output while others decrease output. Consumer preference for fuel-efficient cars left our American auto manufacturers with too many large cars and too much capacity to produce them. Even though they are rapidly reducing the size of their models, they still have more capacity than they need for producing large automobiles; but that is not bad, it is just part of the process and government should not be tempted to meddle with it. In the health area, that means getting away from certificate-of-need as a concept to regulate capacity.
7. The government should establish guidelines for quality, but recognize that quality will ultimately be judged by the individual. Consumer protection often takes the form of government regulating the producer and setting standards for quality. For years the government has tried to regulate standards for mileage and crash restraints in automobiles. The government has also tried to control the use of artificial sweeteners, even though diabetics might choose to accept the risk of cancer to decrease their sugar intake. A more appropriate role for government is to establish guidelines and, as recommended earlier, provide adequate information to the individual making the choice:
8. The government's role in stimulating competition should be to assure fair market conditions, not regulate its particular brand of competition. We each have a slightly different definition of competition. What's important is not that we install one particular model, but that we create the conditions that will allow the market to diversify and shape its own future. These are the principles that will drive my personal decisions in health policy making in the future.
A s an example of how they might be used, consider health planning. The concept is a good one. When it comes to a community's health system, citizens should have a voice. But the regulatory authority we have given planning agencies is dangerous and unnecessary. To a planner, excess capacity is the bane of our health system. To a believer in the market, and according to my sixth principle, excess capacity is a part of change and innovation. As I see it, the elimination of all excess hospital beds in a community would significantly reduce the pressures for change within the hospital industry. Franchising may be okay for McDonald's or Wendy's, but it is not okay for the government. We should franchise neither peanut growing nor health care, and health systems agencies should not have the certificate-of-need authority they now enjoy.
Certificate-of-need should be phased out. During this phasing out period, the certificate-of-need (CON) law might be modified to allow any new capacity to be built, but require that the facility establish its rates within two to three years of start up based on some level of occupancy, perhaps 85 percent, regardless of the actual occupancy. Such a provision would automatically increase the risk for new construction and change the way in which the hospital financing industry looked at expansion projects. To the extent that the facilities could generate their own demand, the provision would have little impact. But remember, changes in our health system must occur across a broad front; to expect the market to work by simply eliminating planning authority is unrealistic. Flexible capacity stimulates efficiency and competition only when consumers recognize relative costs and have an opportunity to make choices. Under such competitive conditions it would be very difficult for a new facility to generate its own demand. Turning to the procompetitive legislative proposals, one of which I sponsor, I would like to address several points. I tend to think in terms of public buyers and private buyers. As the major purchaser of health care, government certainly has a responsibility to shape up its own act. Consequently, I have been very interested in proposals which would extend voucher-type options to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries. The proposals range from fairly limited ones, like the bill by Sen. Heinz (R-Pa.) to capitate HMOs under Medicare, to broader voucher schemes in the mold of Alain Enthoven's ideas.
I recognize both the technical difficulties and unknowns associated with a shift to capitated payments, but I believe we must pursue it now. From the standpoint of the budget process, capitated government contributions would make Medicare spending predictable and precise. From the standpoint of the beneficiary, there would be choices-choices which would allow the individual to best match his or her health needs with a qualified health plan. It all fits with my guiding principles, especially the first two.
On the flip side, we've got to address all the private buyers of health care. In order for competition to work, choices and incentives must be extended not only to the beneficiaries of government programs, but to private citizens as well. If the private sector does not act voluntarily, then it is the government's responsibility to establish the conditions for fair competition. Multiple choice of health plans for employees and equal employer contributions are a necessary part of a more competitive system. I would prefer to see these conditions met voluntarily. I believe it can be done through progressive leadership in the private sector. Services] that competition was going to replace the existing system and would be here in two years, and therefore we could abandon everything that we have in place. I think real consumer choice and the cost savings that will follow is ten years off. I do not believe we should abandon overnight community health planning. We cannot abandon the progress that has been made in utilization review. On the financing side, the notion that putting a cap on Medicaid is a solution to the financing problem is a lot of bunk. I'm not displaying any antipathy toward the administration's views in health The administration has to address both public and private programs. I am hopeful they will do both. I certainly believe that government must deal with the entire health industry, not simply its own programs.
Q: One of your principles advocates consumer choice. What, in your view, is government's role in creating choice?
A: On the public side, if we continue to reimburse for certain kinds of sick care services and not for others, if we just reimburse bills at some established, reasonable, and customary rate, we are doing nothing. So, first of all, I think we must change the way we buy sick care. Government has an obligation to create choice in Medicare and Medicaid. Creating choice will be easier with the elderly than it is with the poor. The oversixty-five group is a more consistent population. Their sick care can be financed under a per capita arrangement adjusted for age, sex, community, and previous health condition. Under such a capitation arrangement, government could encourage insurers and providers to offer benefit packages to elderly citizens who come with an entitlement from government. On the private side, it is really a matter of appealing to employers to get off their backsides and start to do something about the people's need for affordable health care.
Q: In your principles, you discussed creating choice in Medicare, Veterans', and the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program. Does the government have a role to play in creating choice if employers do not get off their backsides?
A: Eventually the government would have to take steps, probably through the tax code changes that are in my bill. I do not think we should do that right off the bat. We have to start with the basic principles of competition and consumer choice in my bill. If people don't start moving in this direction, then government must come along and put a cap on tax-free employer contributions which finance the health insurance premiums of workers. A: Medical education costs should not be buried in room rate charges. They should be separated out so that teaching hospitals can compete with other hospitals on a similar basis. It is a responsibility of government to anticipate the changes that competition will bring to teaching hospitals and to look at new ways for paying for research and training such as through general revenues or a surcharge on all hospital rooms in an area.
Q: What is your attitude about the increasingly large percentage of hospital construction that is funded through tax-exempt bond instruments?
A: The whole area of tax-exempt bonds will be examined, and the use of bonds for hospital construction will be a part of that review. We need to look at hospital bonds in light of the incentives we are creating for the allocation of our health resources, Q: Do you consider yourself an advocate of the administration's block grant proposals as a way to devolve power from Washington to subnational levels of government? A: I support a return of many responsibilities to state and local governments along with the resources to conduct these activities. Block grants are an appropriate tool for transition. As for revenue sharing, it was started to capture the inflation bonus that the federal government was reaping through the effect of inflation on the progressive income tax system, and to return that bonus to the states. With the implementation of indexing of the federal tax system in 1985, this inflation bonus will be gone. Revenue sharing has evolved, though, into a different role of providing flexibility to state and local governments, and this is an important tool in this transition period as we return responsibilities to state and local A: As I have said, government is a better purchaser than provider of services. If PSROs are effective and useful, then government should buy that service, and the private sector should also be able to purchase that service if it is considered worth the investment. Over the next two or three years, government should move to help PSROs stand on their own. In the interim, government should support the effective programs.
